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The ever-present threat of infl  uenza
Vaccines are the most eﬀ   ective mitigation strategy to 
protect against disease caused by inﬂ  uenza. Th  e  average 
seasonal inﬂ  uenza epidemic is estimated to cause 36,000 
deaths in the United States annually [1], and much more 
worldwide. Th   e morbidity and mortality during a 
pandemic is expected to be far greater, however, as seen 
in the 1918 Spanish ﬂ   u wherein between 40 and 50 
million people died [2,3].
Th  e current novel 2009 H1N1 virus arose and circu-
lated rapidly such that a global pandemic was declared 
within 2 months of initial recognition. Th  ankfully, this 
virus has generally been associated with mild illness; 
however, it is responsible for excessive hospitalizations 
and deaths among the young, pregnant women, and 
those with underlying medical conditions. Th  e virus 
caused signiﬁ  cant disease during the Southern Hemi  s-
phere’s winter and caused, as expected, an early inﬂ  uenza 
wave in the Northern Hemisphere, but it was not 
associated with more severe disease, as in the second-
wave phenomenon observed during the early winter of 
the 1918 pandemic. Accordingly, there is an urgent need 
to rapidly develop and distribute vaccines capable of 
eliciting protective immunity for the most susceptible 
segments of the population.
Current seasonal and pandemic infl  uenza vaccines
Inﬂ  uenza vaccines have been in existence since the mid-
1940s [4]. Since then there have been advancements in 
manufacture and puriﬁ   cation techniques, leading to 
modern vaccines with improved safety proﬁ  les  and 
standardized potency. Broadly, there are two types of 
seasonal inﬂ   uenza vaccines currently licensed for use: 
parenteral trivalent inactivated vaccine (TIV), and 
mucosal (nasal) live attenuated inﬂ  uenza vaccine (LAIV). 
In the United States, nonadjuvanted TIV and LAIV are 
approved for use. In Europe, LAIV and both adjuvanted 
and nonadjuvanted TIV are approved for use. A separate 
LAIV vaccine is also licensed for use in Russia.
Twice each year, the World Health Organization uses 
data from the Global Inﬂ  uenza Surveillance Network to 
select three candidate viruses for the updated seasonal 
vaccine. Th  e selected strains are the ones predicted to 
circulate during the subsequent season of each hemis-
phere’s winter. Th   e Northern Hemisphere strain selection 
is performed in February, the Southern Hemisphere 
selection in September. In recent years, the vaccine 
contains two inﬂ  uenza A viruses, H1N1 and H3N2 sub-
types, and an inﬂ  uenza B virus. Once candidate strains 
are identiﬁ  ed, seed viruses are further adapted for high-
yield growth in chicken eggs through genetic reassort-
ment techniques to produce the vaccine virus strain.
After optimization of growth conditions, manufac-
turers create bulk quantities of vaccine virus from 
inoculated embryonated chicken eggs. Th  e vaccine is 
Abstract
Vaccination is the most eff  ective means for the 
prevention of infl  uenza, including pandemic strains. 
An ideal pandemic infl  uenza vaccine should provide 
eff  ective protection with the fewest number of doses 
in the shortest amount of time, and among the 
greatest proportion of the population. The current 
manufacturing processes required for embryonated 
chicken-egg-based infl  uenza vaccines are limited in 
their ability to respond to pandemic situations – these 
limitations include problems with surge capacity, 
the need for egg-adapted strains, the possibility 
of contamination, and the presence of trace egg 
protein. Several vaccine strategies to circumvent 
the defi  ciencies intrinsic to an egg-based infl  uenza 
vaccine are in various phases of development. These 
include the use of cell-culture-based growth systems, 
concomitant use of adjuvants, whole virus vaccines, 
recombinant protein vaccines, plasmid DNA vaccines, 
virus-like particle vaccines, and universal fl  u vaccines.
© 2010 BioMed Central Ltd
Bench-to-bedside review: Vaccine protection 
strategies during pandemic fl  u outbreaks
Joel V Chua1 and Wilbur H Chen*2
REVIEW
*Correspondence: wchen@medicine.umaryland.edu
2Center for Vaccine Development, 685 W Baltimore Street, HSF1, Room 480, 
Baltimore, MD 21201, USA
Full list of author information is available at the end of the article
Chua and Chen Critical Care 2010, 14:218 
http://ccforum.com/content/14/2/218
© 2010 BioMed Central Ltdpuriﬁ  ed by a standardized process of zonal centrifugation 
or column chromatography from virus-containing egg 
allantoic ﬂ   uid, and during this process the virus is 
inactivated by formaldehyde. Treatment with detergents 
disrupts the viral envelope and leads to split virion or 
subvirion vaccines. Prior to vaccine distribution, each 
batch or lot of vaccine is tested for sterility and potency, 
using highly standardized reference reagents to ensure 
the correct concentration of vaccine antigen. In reference 
to H1N1 pandemic vaccines, these biologic reagents may 
only be obtained from Australia’s Th  erapeutic Goods 
Administration, Japan’s National Institute of Infectious 
Disease, the UK’s National Institute for Biological 
Standards and Control, or the US Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) [5].
A LAIV was ﬁ  rst licensed for human use in the United 
States in 2003. It is approved for use in healthy and 
immunocompetent individuals, aged 2 to 49 years. When 
administered intranasally, LAIV provides superior 
protection in children [6,7] compared with TIV, and 
results in herd immunity in children and adults [8]. Th  e 
US LAIV backbone (or the master donor virus) was 
generated by serial passage of an inﬂ  uenza A strain (A/
Ann Arbor/6/60 H2N2) and an inﬂ  uenza B strain (B/Ann 
Arbor/1/66) at lower temperatures in primary chick 
kidney cells, resulting in viruses that are temperature 
sensitive, cold adapted, and attenuated [9,10]. Each of the 
three LAIV strains is prepared using reverse genetic 
reassortment. Plasmids containing six master donor 
virus genes and two wild-type virus genes, representing 
hemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA), are 
electroporated into Vero cells to produce the vaccine 
seed strains [6]. On the other hand, a Russian LAIV has 
been in use since the mid-1970s wherein the master donor 
virus is based on a serial passage-derived, cold-adapted A/
Leningrad/134/57 H2N2 virus and the B/USSR/60/69 
virus [11,12]. Th   e Russian vaccine reassortant is produced 
by co-culturing the master donor virus with wild-type 
virus, and no reverse genetics is used.
Once generated, the bulk viruses for the vaccine are 
mass produced using embryonated chicken eggs. Th  e 
viruses are ﬁ  ltered and concentrated, but not inactivated 
nor disrupted, such that the ﬁ  nal vaccine contains live 
attenuated viruses expressing the contemporary HA and 
NA of that season.
Current basis of infl  uenza vaccine protection
Th   e surface of the enveloped inﬂ  uenza virus is decorated 
by two main antigenic determinants, HA and NA, which 
play important roles in virulence and pandemic potential. 
As such, they are the primary antigenic target of 
inﬂ  uenza vaccines.
Strain-speciﬁ  c serum anti-HA antibodies prevent bind-
ing of the virus to host target receptors, and result in 
eﬃ     cient viral neutralization [13]. Vaccination that 
induces suﬃ   ciently high amounts of anti-HA antibodies 
are necessary to protect an individual from inﬂ  uenza 
infection. A serum hemagglutination-inhibition assay is 
technically simple to perform, automatable, and repre-
sents the conventional means for assessing immuno-
genicity; a hemagglutination-inhibition titer ≥1:40 has 
traditionally deﬁ   ned seroprotection and has been 
associated with a >50% reduction in risk of inﬂ  uenza 
infection [14]. A viral neutralization assay, however, is a 
functional assay that is technically more diﬃ   cult  to 
perform and requires live viruses, and therefore may 
require a biosafety level 3 facility. Th  e  hemagglutination-
inhibition assay typically correlates well with the viral 
neutralization assay.
Anti-NA antibodies may contribute to protective 
immu  nity by blocking the viral NA from releasing 
replicating viruses and allowing the subsequent 
dissemination of the virus to other susceptible host cells. 
Although anti-NA antibodies can mitigate the severity of 
inﬂ  uenza infection [15-18], they alone do not neutralize 
the virus nor prevent infection [19].
Both inactivated parenteral and nasally delivered LAIV 
may induce anti-HA antibody, but LAIV may provide 
protection against inﬂ   uenza despite the absence of a 
serum anti-HA antibody response [6]. Since LAIV is 
mucosally delivered, secretory IgA may be elicited. 
Complexes formed by dimeric secretory IgA are 
potentially more eﬃ   cient in inhibiting viral entry than 
IgG or monomeric IgA [20]. High levels of anti-HA 
secre  tory IgA antibodies can be detected in nasal washes 
within 2 weeks and may persist for 1 year [21]. No 
standard antibody assay, however, has been established 
for evaluating LAIV eﬃ     cacy. Licensure of the current 
LAIV was on the basis of signiﬁ  cant eﬃ   cacy in multiple 
studies and not immunogenicity.
Cell-mediated immunity probably plays an important 
role in the control and prevention of inﬂ  uenza infection, 
but the identiﬁ   cation of cell-mediated immunity 
correlates of protection has been elusive. Th  e  elicitation 
of humoral immunity requires a complex and carefully 
orchestrated interplay of the cellular immune system, and 
no single marker has suﬃ   ciently  predicted  vaccine 
response.
Goals of pandemic infl  uenza vaccines
A major antigenic shift resulting in a pandemic potential 
inﬂ  uenza virus is anticipated to cause a major threat to 
public health. Th  is phenotypic change is predicted to 
result in higher morbidity and mortality – especially 
among segments of the population that are historically at 
lower risk for severe disease due to seasonal inﬂ  uenza, 
such as healthy young adults. In addition, pandemics 
have been typiﬁ   ed by higher transmissibility and 
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widespread migration, and ﬂ  uid borders all facilitate the 
more rapid spread of pandemic inﬂ  uenza viruses.
For these reasons, a pandemic vaccine should ideally 
possess certain characteristics. Th   e vaccine should provide 
protection with the fewest number of doses (that is, a 
single dose) in the shortest amount of time, and among 
the greatest proportion of the population (for example, 
infants, elderly and immunocompromised people). In 
order to ensure that the population will accept 
vaccination, the vaccine must have a high degree of safety 
and little reactogenicity. Other considerations include 
vaccines that are temperature stable (do not require cold-
chain storage) and that avoid the need for needle and 
syringe delivery. In addition, rapid development and 
production of massive quantities of vaccine should 
maintain a consistent and reliable manufacturing process.
Th   ese vaccines must be evaluated prior to approval for 
use under extraordinarily compressed timelines. Th  e 
challenge for the US FDA and other national regulatory 
authorities is to ensure safe and eﬀ  ective vaccines in a 
timely fashion through the evaluation of clinical data to 
support licensure [23]. Th  e US FDA can facilitate rapid 
approval of pandemic vaccines based on limited clinical 
studies on safety and immunogenicity if the manufacturer 
has a US-licensed seasonal inﬂ  uenza vaccine and is using 
the same manufacture process. Under this instance, the 
vaccine is considered a strain change. On the other hand, 
if the manufacture process has not gained previous US 
licensure, safety and eﬀ  ectiveness studies are required. 
Th  e US FDA guidance for accelerated approval of 
pandemic vaccines, however, potentially permits the use 
of an ‘acceptable surrogate marker of activity that is 
reasonably likely to predict clinical beneﬁ  t’  [24]. 
Alternatively, the US FDA has the authority to grant 
Emergency Use Authorization of an unapproved product, 
provided some critical criteria are met, during a national 
public health emergency; this status ends when the 
emergency declaration is terminated. As an example, the 
agency recently issued Emergency Use Authorizations 
for the use of oseltamivir in patients <1 year old and for 
intravenous peramivir. Consequently, US pandemic 
vaccines are pragmatically constrained to licensed 
manufacture processes.
In the European Union, the European Medicines 
Agency has a slightly diﬀ   erent regulatory process, 
allowing a rolling review procedure for the submission of 
data as they become available, in comparison with the 
single formal application procedure of the US FDA. In 
Europe, some manufacturers have adopted the develop-
ment of a core dossier or mock-up vaccine strategy. Th  is 
approach includes the collection of preclinical, safety, 
and immunogenicity data on an index inﬂ  uenza  virus 
that has not recently circulated among humans and 
thereby may mimic the novelty of a pandemic virus [25]. 
Using this strategy, novel 2009 H1N1 adjuvanted 
inﬂ  uenza vaccines and cell-culture-based vaccines were 
approved for use in the European Union.
Current infl  uenza vaccines and inherent limitations
Th  e current manufacture of most inﬂ  uenza vaccines is 
dependent on generating large virus stocks from eggs. 
Th   e requisite supply of suitable eggs is subject to erratic 
production by stressed or ill chicken ﬂ  ocks,  contami-
nation, and other unpredictable events. Eggs need to be 
speciﬁ   c pathogen free, quarantined, and constantly 
monitored to make certain they remain disease free 
before entering the supply chain.
A vaccine virus should be optimally adapted to grow in 
eggs to ensure suﬃ     cient virus yield. Typically, one egg 
leads to one dose of inactivated seasonal ﬂ  u vaccine. Th  ere 
have been reports of growth yields as low as 20 to 50% 
with the novel H1N1 vaccines, compared with seasonal 
viruses (Center for Disease Control and Prevention, 
unpublished data). Wild-type avian H5N1 viruses were 
problematic because replication leads to killing of the 
chicken embryo. Th   e global production capacity of 
inﬂ  uenza vaccine is estimated to be 300 million to 350 
million doses annually or approximately 900 million doses 
of monovalent pandemic vaccine (assuming a single 15 μg 
dose) [26]. Only one-sixth of the world’s population may 
therefore have the opportunity to be immunized.
Th  e time required to prepare the vaccine from virus 
stocks to the point of ﬁ  lling and distribution of vials is a 
further limitation. Under normal circumstances, there is 
an 8-week to 12-week period following receipt of wild-
type virus to the release of a safe reference vaccine virus 
to the manufacturers. Th  e manufacturer may require a 
few weeks to generate high-growth reassortant viruses. 
Another 8-week to 12-week period may be required to 
produce the virus stocks, to concentrate and purify the 
antigen, and to ﬁ  ll vaccine. Lastly, each vaccine lot must 
be quality tested prior to release.
Reverse genetic techniques, using plasmid rescue, have 
enabled researchers and manufacturers to produce high-
yield viruses that express the relevant surface antigens, 
but remain nonpathogenic or attenuated. Th  ese 
techniques have also been found to be suitable for large-
scale vaccine manufacturing [27].
Th  e two major bacterial contaminants of concern are 
Salmonella and Campylobacter, both of which can 
colonize chickens and contaminate eggs. During the 1976 
Swine Flu vaccine campaign there was an increased 
incidence of Guillain–Barré syndrome (GBS) [28], an 
ascending motor paralysis characterized by autoimmune 
demyelination. Although a link between an antecedent 
Campylobacter jejuni infection and GBS is known, this 
has not been established as the cause of GBS with the 
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inﬂ  uenza vaccine has not been observed with subsequent 
inﬂ   uenza vaccines. A biologic mechanism for post-
immunization GBS has been hypothesized to involve the 
synergistic eﬀ   ects of endotoxins (the product of 
Salmonella contamination) and vaccine-induced auto-
immunity [30]. Th  e presence of autoreactive antibodies 
against common cellular moieties of neurons (that is, 
gangliosides), however, has been reported to be 
associated with GBS [31]. An alternate etiology impli-
cates sialylated HA complexes in the 1976 vaccine that 
may have provided the molecular mimicry leading to the 
development of anti-GM1 ganglioside antibodies, there-
by leading to excess GBS cases [32]. Th  e analysis of 
sialylation of HA in vaccines and the measurement of 
anti-GM1 antibody have therefore been proposed as a 
prelicensure requirement [33]. With the current H1N1 
pandemic vaccines, there have not been reports of excess 
cases of GBS beyond the expected baseline rate.
A ﬁ  nal limitation of the current inﬂ  uenza vaccine is egg 
allergy. Th   e manufacture process may cause trace 
amounts of egg protein to remain in the ﬁ  nal vaccine. For 
those people with serious egg allergy, vaccination is a 
contraindication. Th   is further illustrates the need to have 
a pandemic ﬂ  u vaccine prepared via a diﬀ  erent substrate.
Vaccine technologies in development
Several vaccine strategies to address the critical needs of a 
pandemic vaccine are in various phases of development. 
Th   ese include the use of cell-culture-based growth 
systems, concomitant use of adjuvants, whole virus 
vaccines, recombinant protein vaccines, plasmid DNA 
vaccines, use of virus-like particles, and universal ﬂ  u 
vaccines.
Cell-culture-based growth systems have been approved 
for use in some European countries. Th  ese  technologies 
use African Green monkey kidney (Vero), Madin–Darby 
canine kidney and other mammalian cell lines as the 
substrate for viral replication, rather than hen’s eggs. 
Madin–Darby canine kidney cells have been routinely 
used for viral plaque assays and for clinical isolation of 
inﬂ   uenza viruses [34-36].  Th  e virus yield using cell 
culture is comparable with that of eggs [34]. Cell culture 
oﬀ  ers a reliable and ﬂ  exible production process, which 
can be performed using closed aseptic techniques. Th  e 
process allows for growth of a broad range of authentic 
virus strains without the need for egg adaptation [37]. 
Several cell-culture-based inﬂ  uenza vaccines have been 
shown to be safe, well tolerated and immunogenic in 
children, healthy young adults, and even among the older 
population [37-40]. One limitation for rapid licensure of 
cell-culture-based vaccine is the perceived risk that 
mammalian cell lines have the potential for 
tumorigenicity and oncogenicity. Th   e requirement for the 
presence of animal serum (or fetal bovine serum) in the 
cell culture medium also presents a special problem for 
US licensure. Animal serum must be ensured to be free 
of potential contamination with fungi, bacteria, viruses 
and agents of transmissible spongiform encephalopathies, 
and the serum must be readily available and undergo 
batch variation testing. Th  e use of synthetic protein-
based media, rather than animal serum, may help 
minimize the risk of transmissible spongiform encephalo-
pathies and viruses, but these techniques are complicated 
and currently the cost is prohibitive [34,41].
Adjuvants have the potential to boost the immuno-
genicity of inﬂ  uenza vaccines and thereby are a dose-
sparing strategy. Th  e only adjuvant that is currently US 
FDA approved is based on mineral salts (for example, 
aluminum hydroxide or alum). Th  e interest in more 
immuno  stimulatory adjuvants gained momentum when 
an inactivated avian H5N1 vaccine was found to be 
poorly immunogenic [42]  and the addition  of  alum 
provided little to no beneﬁ   t [43,44]. Oil-in-water 
emulsion adjuvant systems have been approved for use 
with inactivated inﬂ  uenza vaccines in Europe since 1997 
(that is, MF-59). In 2009, however, the European 
Medicines Agency granted approval for ASO3 to be used 
with formulations of the H1N1 pandemic vaccine. 
According to the World Health Organization, among the 
150 million doses of H1N1 pandemic vaccine distributed 
globally, 30% are adjuvanted formulations containing 
either MF-59 or ASO3; primarily in use in Europe and 
Canada [45]. Th  ese adjuvants are safe, associated with 
mild and transient local reactogenicity, and are otherwise 
well tolerated [43,44,46-48]. When combined with an 
inactivated avian H5N1 vaccine, MF-59 [46,47]  and 
ASO3 [48] demonstrated superior immunogenicity com-
pared with the unadjuvanted vaccine. Other immuno-
stimulatory adjuvants that might prove safe and eﬀ  ective 
include saponins, immunostimulatory complexes, and 
innate immune receptor ligand/agonists (for example, 
monophosphoryl A, unmethylated CpG, mutant heat-
labile enterotoxin, and ﬂ  agellin). Th  ese adjuvants there-
fore hold the potential to stretch out existing limited 
vaccine supplies. Furthermore, adjuvants may induce 
more broadly protective immune responses; the elicited 
antibodies were cross-reactive against heterologous 
H5N1 strains [46,48]. Th   ese heterotypic immune 
responses may be vital for protection against emerging 
clades and subclades of pandemic viruses [10].
Whole virus vaccines were originally abandoned 
because of the increased reactogenicity compared with 
subvirion vaccines [49]. Th   e 1976 swine ﬂ  u vaccine was a 
whole virus vaccine, adding to the stigma of using whole 
virus vaccines. Inactivated whole virus vaccines, however, 
can elicit greater immunogenic responses than subvirion 
vaccines and generate cross-reactive antibodies against 
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Hungarian-approved and a European Medicines Agency-
approved H1N1 whole virus vaccine are available.
Recombinant protein expression systems hold the 
promise of rapidly generating puriﬁ  ed subunit vaccines. 
One such vaccine is composed of recombinant HA from 
a Baculovirus expression system. Recombinant HA 
vaccines are highly puriﬁ  ed and contain no antibiotics or 
egg protein. Because of the higher concentration of 
antigens, they elicit stronger immune responses with less 
reactogenicity among healthy young and older adults [53-
55]. A phase III trial of a recombinant HA vaccine was 
eﬀ  ective against culture-proven inﬂ  uenza – presenting 
86% cumulative incidence reduction [55]. Nevertheless, 
the regulatory barrier that exists includes the concern for 
residual amounts of insect cell and Baculovirus proteins.
Recombinant inﬂ  uenza virus-like particles are another 
vaccine technology under clinical development. Th  ese 
vaccines mimic the live virus but are unable to replicate, 
as they lack the internal machinery or genetic material 
necessary for replication. Th  ese virus-like particles are 
assembled in insect or mammalian cells and simul-
taneously express HA and NA along with the matrix M1 
protein [56]. Virus-like particles are strongly immuno-
genic and have been found to be protective in seasonal 
and highly pathogenic inﬂ  uenza virus murine challenge 
models [57].
Plasmid DNA-based vaccines are yet another promis-
ing vaccine technology still at early stages of develop-
ment. Th  is technology is based on plasmid DNA taken 
up by muscle cells (transfection) resulting in the expres-
sion of plasmid encoded protein [58]. Th  rough direct 
interaction with B cells and antigen-presenting cells, the 
host immune system is stimulated as a result of this 
transfection [58]. An H5N1 plasmid DNA vaccine that 
encoded HA, nucleoprotein, and matrix protein M2 
provided protection in mouse and ferret models of lethal 
infection [59]. Th  e potential advantages of this tech-
nology include a shorter time for vaccine production, a 
nondependence on cell culture media, and theoretically 
eliciting both humoral and cell-mediated immune 
responses [58,59]. Th   ese possible beneﬁ  ts have yet to be 
proven in human trials.
One of the ultimate goals of inﬂ  uenza vaccine research 
is to develop a universal vaccine that would provide 
durable and longlasting protection against all inﬂ  uenza A 
strains, rendering the need for annual vaccination obso-
lete [60]. One target is the ectodomain of matrix protein 
2 (M2e), a highly conserved 23-amino-acid protein 
component of the virus envelope. Although M2e is a 
weak immunogen, after combining M2e with a carrier 
protein (such as hepatitis B virus core particles) the 
resulting anti-M2e antibody conferred protection in a 
mouse model of lethal inﬂ   uenza infection [61]. Other 
highly con  served inﬂ  uenza virus epitopes are under con-
si  dera  tion as potential universal ﬂ  u vaccine candidates.
Pandemic vaccination of the population
As pandemic vaccines will probably be in short supply, it 
is paramount that a tiered system of apportionment is 
developed to identify people at increased risk of 
substantial morbidity and mortality. In conjunction with 
allocation, an aggressive campaign to implement the 
immunization of these at-risk groups will need to be 
prioritized. Who are the most susceptible? During 
seasonal epidemics, the predominance of severe disease 
aﬀ  ects the extremes of age – older people and young 
infants. With the current 2009 H1N1 pandemic, the 
majority of cases have occurred among the younger adult 
population (age <65), with only 5% of older people 
aﬀ  ected [62-64]. Nevertheless, the severity appears to be 
similar to seasonal epidemics, as one-quarter of the 
hospitalized patients had at least one underlying medical 
condition; these conditions include asthma, emphysema, 
diabetes, chronic cardiovascular disorders, chronic renal 
disease, neurologic disorders, and immunosuppression of 
varying etiology [63,65]. Pregnant women are at increased 
risk of complications [65]. As such, the young and 
pregnant women are among the highest priority for the 
current H1N1 immunization campaign. For US public 
policy, the guiding principles concerning vaccination are 
based on the recognition of groups at high risk of 
exposure, such as healthcare personnel, close contact 
with infants <6 months of age, and other related 
caregivers. Th  e World Health Organization recognizes 
the variability in country-speciﬁ   c H1N1 epidemiology 
and access to vaccine and other inﬂ  uenza-related 
resources, but also recommends that healthcare workers 
be among the highest priority to protect the integrity of 
essential health infrastructure; country-speciﬁ  c  condi-
tions should dictate the prioritization of the other high-
risk segments of the population to reduce transmission, 
morbidity, and mortality.
Prior to the initiation of massive immunization, 
another critical question must be answered. Th  e  optimal 
dose needs to be identiﬁ  ed, and this may depend on age 
and underlying medical conditions. Th   e standard dose of 
the annual TIV contains 15 μg HA per virus strain. With 
the inactivated subvirion H5N1 vaccine, however, a 15 μg 
dose was insuﬃ   cient [66] and two 90 μg doses separated 
by 28 days was necessary to achieve immunogenic 
responses among >50% of recipients [42,67]. Th  erefore, 
when an inﬂ  uenza virus strain is completely novel – as in 
the H5N1 virus – multiple doses (that is, two or more 
doses) of vaccine may be necessary to achieve protection. 
Fortunately, the data show that a single 15 μg dose of the 
2009 H1N1 vaccine is suﬃ   cient to elicit seroprotection 
among >93% of the healthy young adults [68,69].
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handful of pandemic vaccines are being made available in 
record speed. In the United States, the rapid manufacture 
of the 2009 H1N1 monovalent vaccines required the 
open collaboration of the Department of Health and 
Human Services, academia, and industry at a level of 
intensity never before experienced. At the global level, 
the World Health Organization has relied heavily on 
close collaboration with industry partners and indepen-
dent experts, such as the Strategic Advisory Group of 
Experts on Immunization, for the concerted response to 
the current inﬂ  uenza pandemic. At the time of writing, 
donated H1N1 vaccine is planned for distribution to 95 
resource-poor countries. In the United States, approved 
vaccines are based on traditional manufacturing 
processes, although adjuvanted vaccines are under ﬁ  eld 
testing. In Europe and Canada, adjuvanted and cell-
culture-based vaccines are being used. Vaccination 
policies guiding these events have been informed by the 
existing limited data, and continuous epidemiologic 
surveillance is required to determine the eﬃ   cacy of the 
current vaccination campaign and to detect the presence 
of mutations.
In conclusion, pandemic inﬂ   uenza represents an 
unpre  dictable and critical public health emergency. 
Vaccination remains the most eﬀ  ective means to prevent 
and control inﬂ   uenza infection. Th  e current manu-
facturing process, based on chicken eggs, has inherent 
limitations. Next-generation inﬂ  uenza vaccines and other 
technologies are under development and provide the 
promise of improved protection.
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